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I. Introduction
In 2005, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Protocol) came into force.'
* Associate Director, Adolescent Health Programs, National Partnership for Women
& Families; Adjunct Professor, American University Washington College of Law. The
author would like to thank Frances Eberhard. Paul Gugliuzza, Zinaida Miller. and Marya
Torrez for their comments on earlier drafts. The author is particularly grateful to Professor
Charles Ngwena for his leadership in the field of reproductive rights and for organizing the
symposium, "Reproductive and Sexual Health and the African Women's Protocol," with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice.
1. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of
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Since that time, the Protocol has received scant attention in legal
scholarship. Where the Protocol has been mentioned, by and large it has
received praise as a major step forward for women's rights on the
continent.2  Much of that praise is merited. The Protocol includes broad
rights to non-discrimination, equality, and dignity, and it addresses a variety
of areas such as labor and employment, marriage and the family, the legal
system, the political process and public life, education, conflict, the market,
the environment, and health.3
Drafted over eight years, the process for creating the document was
marked by stops and starts, political compromise, and the influence of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). The text of the Protocol reflects the
central purposes of those who lobbied for a regional instrument that focused
on women's rights.4  First, the Protocol attempts to fill in the gaps in the
region's human rights instrument-the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights (the Charter).' The Charter only references women's
equality in two places6 and has rarely been used to support women's rights.7
Women in Africa, adopted July 11, 2003, reprinted in Martin Semalulu Nsibirwa, A Brief
Analysis of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights in
Africa, I AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 40, 53 (2001) (entered into force Nov. 25, 2005) [hereinafter
Protocol].
2. See, e.g., ROSEMARY SEMAFUMU MUKASA, THE AFRICAN WOMEN'S PROTOCOL:
HARNESSING A POTENTIAL FOR POSITIVE CHANGE (2008); cf Rachel Murray, Women's
Rights and the Organization of African Unity and African Union: The Protocol on the
Rights of Women in Africa, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 253,
264 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 2005) (critiquing the approach of the Protocol as
wavering between two objectives); Rachel Rebouch6, Note, Labor, Land, and Women's
Rights in Africa: Challenges for the New Protocol on the Rights of Women, 19 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 235,236 (2006).
3. See Murray, supra note 2, at 268 (noting that although "the Protocol covers
economic, social and cultural rights" it is broader in other areas).
4. Melinda Adams & Alice Kang, Regional Advocacy Networks and the Protocol on
the Rights of Women in Africa, 3 POL. & GENDER 451, 459 (2007).
5. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 59
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter Charter]. The Charter has been ratified by all
member states of the Organization of African Unity/African Union. Christof Heyns, The
African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter. 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 679,
683 (2004). See also Protocol, supra note 1. Preamble ("Despite the ratification of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other international human rights
instruments by the majority of States Parties .... women in Africa still continue to be
victims of discrimination and harmful practices.").
6. See Charter, supra note 5. art. 18(3) (eliminating discrimination against women);
id art. 2 (prohibiting sexual discrimination in particular and entitling individuals to equality
before the law and equal protection of the law, though not referencing gender).
7. At the time of writing, the Commission had not decided a case concerning
women's rights. Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, Reclaiming (Wo)manity: The Merits and
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Second, proponents of a Protocol wanted to create ownership for women's
rights in a context where rights are often criticized as elitist or as
challenging cultural norms.8  As two authors note, "[I]t is the first
instrument of its kind ... developed by Africans, for Africans." 9 Drafters
proposed creating an 'African CEDAW' 1-a document that would temper
the Charter's allegiance to tradition, morals, and custom with language that
would have the legitimacy of international human rights law but would still
address women's lived experiences."' The Protocol attempts to accomplish
these goals in a number of ways. The Protocol draws heavily from
CEDAW and other international documents, and it includes much of what
is already protected in international and regional instruments. In addition,
the Protocol (particularly its early drafts) elaborates on rights in the Charter
and includes rights that are not found in CEDAW or in the Charter.
This Article examines the drafting of an 'African CEDAW ' 12 and
concludes that it was a very fragmented process with consequences for the
efficacy of the Protocol as a whole. Part I provides an overview of the
drafting process including a brief critique of its shortcomings. Part II
highlights the dominant influences underpinning the Protocol by way of
textual examples. My analysis reveals a lack of cohesiveness in the final
document that corresponds to a lack of vision for the instrument, suggesting
how the patchwork approach to the Protocol may shape its future
Demerits of the African Protocol on Women's Rights, 53 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 63, 70
(2006). See VINCENT 0. ORLU NMEHIELLE, THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: ITS
LAWS, PRACTICES, AND INSTITUTIONS 133-34 (2001) (stating that, before the Protocol, the
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights had not investigated women's rights
issues using its Article 48 power under the Charter; see also Bronwen Manby, Civil and
Political Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Articles 1 7, in THE
AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986-2006,
171, 181 (Rachel Murray & Malcolm Evans eds., 2008) (noting that the discriminatory
aspects of customary law and citizenship law have been the focus of litigation on the
national and international level).
8. See FAREDA BANDA, WOMEN, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AFRICAN
PERSPECTIVE 44 (2005) (citing Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor
of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT'L L. J. 201 (2001)).
9. Rose Gawaya & Rosemary Semafumu Mukasa. The African Women's Protocol: A
New Dimension for Women's Rights in Africa. 13 GENDER& DEVELOPMENT 42. 42 (2005).
10. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
11. Report of the Meeting of Experts on the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights of Women in Africa 110, Nov. 12 16. 2001.
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/lhr docs/african/docs/oau/oaul0.doc (last visited Feb. 19, 2010) (on
file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
12. Murray, supra note 2. at 253 54.
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interpretation. Part III focuses on the health and reproductive rights in
Article 14 in light of the Protocol's theoretical tensions. Three problems
are analyzed: the failure of the Protocol to highlight how various articles
relate to reproductive health rights (such as HIV prevention and prohibition
of early marriage), the narrow construction of a broader right to health, and
the dual rejection and embrace of women's roles as mothers. This last
tension in particular-the intersection of the elimination of stereotypes
found in formal and substantive equality rights and the promotion of a
positive cultural context for women-best illustrates contradictions in the
theoretical influences underpinning the Protocol. I conclude on an
optimistic note. Although the Protocol may have missed opportunities to
approach women's reproductive health more holistically and critically, the
interpretation of the Protocol moving forward can be supplemented with
defining principles that were underdeveloped in its drafting.
I. The Drafting Process and Its Difficulties
A. The Intended Purposes of the Protocol
The Protocol followed a broader movement to protect women's rights
at the regional level.' 3 Nowhere is this clearer than in the Constitutive Act
of the African Union, the treaty that dissolved the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) and created a new regional body.' 4  While the Constitutive
Act focuses on sovereignty (promoting unity, peace, and setting limits to
intervention in state's affairs), it acknowledges women in a way that the
Charter 5 and OAU's Charter do not. 16 For example, the Preamble speaks
13. See Fareda Banda, Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in
Africa, in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN
PRACTICE, 1986-2006, 441, 442-43 (Rachel Murray & Malcolm Evans eds., 2008) (stating
that the regional approach to human rights needed reform and that some women's rights
initiatives were taken on by sub-regional bodies).
14. Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000,
http://mirror.undp.org/african_ union en/treaties/constitution.pdf (entered into force May 26.
2001).
15. The Charter focused on the protection of state sovereignty. Adrien Katherine
Wing & Tyler Murray Smith. The New African Union and Women's Rights, 13 TRANSNATL
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 58 (2003).
16. See Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Back to the Future: The Imperative of Prioritizing
for the Protection of Human Rights in Africa. 47 J. AFR. L. 1. 9 (2003) (noting that the
OAU's Charter reflected states' insecurities about newly won independence, and thus
couched rights in sovereignty and domestic governance).
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of a united and strong Africa built on partnerships with civil society, "in
particular women.0 7  Specifically, Article 4(1) lists the goal of the
"[p]romotion of gender equality."18
In this spirit of support for women's rights, national, regional, and
international NGOs approached the OAU about a Protocol to the Charter.
The process took shape in 1995 when Women in Law and Development in
Africa (WiLDAF) co-hosted a seminar with the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights (the Commission).' 9 Participants passed a
resolution calling for a Protocol to the Charter20 and the appointment of a
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women. 2' In its 31 st Ordinary Session
in 1995, the Organization of African Unity Assembly of Heads of States
and Government agreed to invest in the project of drafting a Protocol.22
Advocates could have revised the Charter rather than drafting a
Protocol,23 but they started from the premise that the Charter was too
24difficult to amend. Not only would obtaining agreement among a
majority of member states on new language be challenging,25 but advocates
believed passing the amendments necessary to cure the Charter's
26deficiencies would be daunting. The Charter refers to women in only two
17. Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra note 14, Preamble.
18. Id. art. 4. Gender equality is a principle and not an "objective" under Article 3 of
the Charter, although the Charter recognizes the objectives of preventing disease and
promoting good health as well as promoting human rights and "other relevant human rights
instruments." Charter, supra note 5, art. 3.
19. Adams & Kang, supra note 4, at 460.
20. Forty-four representatives fiom the Commission and NGOs participated. See id at
460 (explaining that the Charter was "inefficient and affected women in contradictory ways"
creating a need for a "more responsive" Charter) (citations omitted).
21. Afiican Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, Special Rapporteur on the
Rights of Women in Africa, http://www.achpr.org/english/ info/index women en.html (last
visited October 18, 2009) (explaining the creation of the position to "reinforce and promote
rights of women in Africa") (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice).
22. AHG Res. 240, 31 st Sess. (June 1995).
23. Before the Protocol some scholars interpreted Article 18 read with Article 2 as
conferring rights found in international documents like CEDAW (such as a state duty to
modify customs that discriminate). Fitnat Naa-Adjeley Adjetey, Reclaiming the African
Woman's Individuality: The Struggle Between Women's Reproductive Autonomy and
African Society and Culture. 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1351. 1371 (1995).
24. See Murray, supra note 2. at 261 n.51 (citing a WiLDAF publication).
25. See Charter, supra note 5. art. 55 (requiring a simple majority of member states to
amend the Charter).
26. See NMEHIELLE, supra note 7. at 244 (summarizing the argument that "the Charter,
as a document that is inspired by the virtues and the values of African civilization, cannot
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places. Article 2 includes the category of sex in the non-discrimination
clause,27 and Article 18(3) states: "The State shall ensure the elimination of
every discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of the
rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in international declarations
and conventions., 28 Some observers argue that these two provisions, taken
with the non-gendered equal protection guarantee in Article 329 and the
deference accorded to international standards in Articles 6030 and 61 ,31
imply broader protection for women's rights in the Charter.
3 2
per se be an effective tool to protect the rights of women in view of the role of women in the
traditional African family").
27. Article 2 states, "Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights
and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any
kind such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion,
national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status." Charter, supra note 5, art. 2.
28. Charter, supra note 5, art. 18(3); see id. art. 18(4) (concluding with a clause that
guarantees a right to special measures for the "aged and disabled" that are "in keeping with
their physical and moral needs").
29. See id. art. 3 ("1. Every individual shall be equal before the law. 2. Every
individual shall be entitled to equal protection of the law.").
30. Article 60 states:
The Commission shall draw inspiration fiom international law on human and
peoples' rights, particularly from the provisions of various Afiican instruments
on human and peoples' rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of
the Organization of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
other instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the
field of human and peoples' rights as well as fiom the provisions of various
instruments adopted within the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations of
which the parties to the present Charter are members.
Id. art. 60.
31. Article 61 states:
The Commission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary measures to
determine the principles of law, other general or special international
conventions, laying down rules expressly recognized by member states of the
Organization of African Unity, African practices consistent with international
norms on human and people's rights, customs generally accepted as law, general
principles of law recognized by African states as well as legal precedents and
doctrine.
Id. art. 61.
32. See Chaloka Beyani, Toward a More Effective Guarantee of Women's Rights in
the African System, in HuMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 285, 285 (Rebecca Cook ed., 1995) (explaining that widely accepted
standards of human rights in Africa "may have a particular status within general
international law"); see also NMEIELLE. supra note 7. at 245-46 ("Articles 60 and 61
ensured that other international instruments could be incorporated into the Charter through
the interpretation of its provisions.").
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Critics of this interpretation note that the Charter's deference to
international law pales in comparison to its emphasis on protecting
familial and cultural values, which many in the regional (and
international) women's rights movement saw as contradictory to
women's equality. 33  Article 17 and Article 29 of the Charter, for
example, were cited by national courts to undermine gender equality
claims under customary law. 4  Article 17 creates a state duty to
promote morals and traditional values that are recognized by the
community.3' Article 29 elaborates on the special role of the state
36
and the individual in protecting cultural norms.
For those supporting a new protocol, the structure of Article 18,
the only article of the Charter that refers to "women," was
emblematic of the Charter's recognition of gender in terms of family
roles. First, Article 18(3) marries women's rights to the rights of
children. Other international human rights documents have taken a
similar position; the American Convention on Human Rights 38 is one
33. NMEHIELLE, supra note 7, at 243-45.
34. See Center for Reproductive Rights, The Protocol on the Rights of Women in
Africa: An Instrument for Advancing Reproductive and Sexual Rights (Briefing Paper) 2-4
(Feb. 2006), http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pub bp
africa.pdf (noting widespread acceptance that the Charter has been ineffective in promoting
women's rights and the basis for national courts to undermine women's rights); see also
Charter, supra note 5, art. 17(3) ("The promotion and protection of morals and traditional
values recognized by the community shall be the duty of the State.").
35. Charter, supra note 5, art. 17.
36. Article 29 states:
The individual shall also have the duty: 1. to preserve the harmonious
development of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect of the
family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in case of need; 2. To
serve his national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at
its service; ... 4. To preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity,
particularly when the latter is threatened; ... 7. To preserve and strengthen
positive African cultural values in his relations with other members of the
society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation and, in general, to
contribute to the promotion of the moral well being of society; 8. To contribute
to the best of his abilities, at all times and at all levels, to the promotion and
achievement of African unity.
Id. art. 29.
37. See Heyns, supra note 5, at 687 88 (arguing that the "lumping together of women
and children" perpetuates "outdated stereotypes").
38. Article 17 of the American Convention on Human Rights states in part:
1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the state. 2. The right of men and
women of marriageable age to marry and to raise a family shall be
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example. 39 This approach may be at odds with the gender equality
norms expressed in international human rights documents like
40CEDAW, which emphasize the elimination of stereotypes.
Furthermore, Article 18(1) focuses on the protection of the family as
the "natural unit and basis of society," and obliges the state to "take
care of its physical health and moral.",4' Article 18(2) further requires
the state "to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and
traditional values recognized by the community. 4 2 The Charter does
not define morals, values, or specify which community is to define
them. Moreover, the Charter does not indicate how the state is to
help families protect those values.
A generous reading of Article 18 offered by at least one scholar is that
it imposes a duty on states to "create societal conditions in which families
might flourish. 4 3 But the type of family that the Charter might envision, as
a unit grounded in tradition and community norms, may be fixed. The
protection of the Charter may not apply to any configuration of the family.
Instead, the document may not protect those families out of step with
community norms that value male-headed, heterosexual households.44
Even if the recognition of what would help families flourish includes an
recognized, if they meet the conditions required by domestic laws,
insofar as such conditions do not affect the principle of
nondiscrimination established in this Convention ....
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered
into force July 18, 1978).
39. NMEHIELLE, supra note 7, at 132.
40. See, e.g., International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt,
Sept. 5-13, 1994, Programme of Action, 4.19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13 (Oct. 18, 1994)
("Schools, the media and other social institutions should seek to eliminate stereotypes in all
types of communication and educational materials that reinforce existing inequities between
males and females and undermine girls' self-esteem."); The Fourth World Conference on
Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace, Beijing, China. Sept. 4-15, 1995,
Beiing Declaration and Platform for Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 and
A/CONF. 177/20/ADD/I [hereinafter Beijing Platform] (discussing concerns about gender
role stereotypes throughout the document). See also BANDA, supra note 8, at 183 (noting the
ICPD revolutionized thinking about reproductive matters by changing the paradigm fiom
fertility and population control to women's rights to decision-making and well-being).
41. Charter, supra note 5. art. 18(1).
42. Id. art. 18(2)
43. NMEIELLE. supra note 7. at 131 32. See also Adjetey. supra note 23. at 1376 77
(noting that the reference to cultural values is ill-defined).
44. See NMEIELLE, supra note 7. at 77 (explaining how the Charter could be
interpreted as promoting a heterosexual conception of the family given the decision to omit
sexual orientation from the Protocol and the antipathy toward same-sex relationships in
many African countries).
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appreciation of the rights of women in the family, many have highlighted
that cultural values are often in tension with women's rights.4 5
The demarcation of family roles in customary law or in community
practice has been a point of conflict between the agenda for women's
equality and many African customs. Custom that is patriarchal-practices
that confer property ownership and decision-making to men exclusively, for
example-has been criticized as oppressive and antithetical to gender
equality. 46  This is not to ignore the rich literature that questions the
dichotomy between culture and equality. 41 Situating women's human rights
as contingent on family identity supports some advocates' worst fears that
women will feel pressure to conform to traditional expectations for wives
and mothers. As the last Part of this Article highlights, the identification of
women as family members and the strength of that association in many
African cultures stigmatizes single women or women without children as
well as overemphasizes women's caretaking role. 48  The problem of
stereotyping remains if the protection of women's rights is tied to their roles
in families as wives or mothers.49
The project of writing a Protocol was intended to mitigate some of
these tensions by acknowledging the importance of African cultural
traditions and promoting those values which complement women's rights to
equality and dignity. To this end, drafters emphasized women's
participation in writing the Protocol and focused on women's roles in
creating community or cultural practices and values.50  Advocates also
45. Adams & Kang, supra note 4, at 460.
46. NMEHIELLE, supra note 7, at 134, 244. See also ROSEMARY SEMAFUMU MUKASA,
THE AFRICA WOMEN'S PROTOCOL: A TOOL TO MOBILISE RESOURCES FOR FINANCING
GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT (forthcoming 2010) (describing
traditional practices in three Afiican countries that are harmful to women) (on file with the
author). This is not a critique limited to the African context. International women's rights
advocates have long argued that situating women in families has excluded them from the
reach of public international law. See, e.g., Karen Engle, Fiews from the Margins: A
Response to David Kennedy, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 105, 106-07 (1994).
47. Scholars such as Tracy Higgins have studied custom that both empowers and
limits women's agency. Tracy Higgins et al., Gender Equality and Customary Marriage:
Bargaining in the Shadow of Post-Apartheid Legal Pluralism. 30 FORDHAM INT'L. L.J. 1653.,
1708 (2007). See Mukasa, supra note 9. at 48 (describing how a lack of cultural influence
on women's rights and weak policies that recognize gender equality both contribute to the
problems of achieving autonomy for women).
48. BANDA. supra note 8. at 91.
49. See id (explaining the role of motherhood and noting how custody is awarded to
mothers and fathers based on the age and maturity of the child).
50. See id. at 69 (noting the final draft's treatment of the right to positive cultural
context in Article 17).
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highlighted issues ignored by the Charter (and the Commission) by
incorporating rights found in international documents like CEDAW, but
changed the wording to acknowledge the practices of various African
communities. For instance, the right of consent to marriage and to the
equality between spouses 5' drew attention to women's rights within family
but used language suited to an African regional instrument 2
B. History of the Drafting Process
With these motivations in mind, in 1997, two years after the WiLDAF
meeting, members of the Commission convened a working group of experts
to write a first draft of the Protocol 3 This group consisted of Commission
members, representatives from African NGOs, and international
54
observers . One commentator noted that the working group did not appear
to have a vision for the Protocol 5  Although the first draft mirrored the
structure of the Charter, expanding on as well as adding rights, overall it
looked like a "wish list" of rights to end discrimination against women and
56focused on issues related to family life, violence, and cultural practices.
The 1997 draft was then submitted to the Commission for comments.5  At
this point, NGOs that had reviewed the draft took an active role in moving
the process forward, but were less involved in debating the substance of the
text. The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) hosted a workshop in
late 1997 to help facilitate NGOs' comments on the draft and passed a
resolution calling for completion of the drafting process. 58 The NGO lobby
met with some success. The Commission met with the ICJ, WiLDAF, and
other organizations to amend the draft and set the terms for the appointment
of a Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women.59 In July 1998 at its 23rd
51. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 6.
52. NMEHIELLE, supra note 7, at 244.
53. Mary Wandia, Ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa: The Comoros Lead the Way, FEMNET,
Jan. 1, 2004, at 2, http://old.apc.org/english/capacity/policy/mmtk ictpol humanrights
African Charterprotocol.doc (last visited Feb. 19, 2010) (on file with Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
54. Id.
55. BANDA. supra note 8. at 68.
56. Id. at 68-69.
57. Wandia, supra note 53. at 2.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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Session, the Commission formally endorsed the appointment of the Special
Rapporteur and selected a Commissioner as Rapporteur to shepherd the
drafting process. 60  The Special Rapporteur convened another working
group of experts to consider the draft. 61 From the start, she was criticized
for failing to seek wide consultation. Commentators noted that the
Rapporteur excluded many NGOs, observers, and state representatives by
only seeking input from government representatives of seven of fifty-three
states.62
In the next year the Commission adopted a draft Protocol 63 (as revised
by the Special Rapporteur) and sent the draft to the OAU for
consideration.64 Like the previous draft, the 1999 draft consisted of twenty-
three articles and focused on discrimination, the elimination of harmful
traditional practices, and violence against women.65 What is striking is that
despite two years of mobilization by civil society and the appointment of a
Special Rapporteur the draft's substance had not changed all that much.
One noticeable difference was that the draft was organized more like
CEDAW, addressing areas of public or private life where women were
subject to discrimination or disparate treatment, and relied less on the
structure of the Charter.66  The Commission had made only a few
amendments by this stage. It revised the language to emphasize the rights
of the girl-child, added provisions on the elderly and the disabled, and put
forward an absolute prohibition of polygamy. 6' The draft was sent to the
OAU in 2000.
The OAU Women's Unit amended the draft by adding language from
African regional instruments (of significance was the incorporation of the
then-draft Convention on Harmful Traditional Practices 68) and
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Murray, supra note 2, at 263 n. 58 (noting that many NGOs did not see a copy
of the Draft Protocol until the 2001 Experts Meeting); see also BANDA, supra note 8, at 75
(noting complaints from NGOs regarding a lack of consultation).
63. Draft Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women, Nov. 15, 1999,
DOC/OS (XXVII)/ 159b.
64. BANDA. supra note 8. at 74.
65. Odinkalu, supra note 16. at 21.
66. See BANDA. supra note 8. at 70 (noting the similarity between the Protocol draft
and CEDAW rights within the family).
67. Id. at 73.
68. Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights
of African Women in Africa, CAB/LE/66.6/Rev. 1. Sept. 13, 2000 (entered into force Nov.
25, 2005); see also Wandia, supra note 53 (noting assistance from the Inter-African
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incorporating the input of Member States. 69  The Southern African
Development Community also suggested changes to the provisions on
violence, temporary measures, and states' ability to make reservations. 70
The draft shifted between organizations, each adding and deleting language.
There was very little communication among the bodies revising the draft or
with civil society.
In 2001, the OAU General Secretariat convened a Government Experts
Meeting (the Experts Meeting) and representatives from forty-four states
were in attendance. NGO and international organizations were allowed to
participate as observers. Interestingly, state representatives both rolled
back rights in the draft and included higher standards than those already in
international human rights law. Participants at the Experts Meeting added
rights for refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced and returnees;
they added protection for "women in distress;" and they strengthened the
Protocol's treatment of temporary special measures. At the same time,
major disagreements erupted over the complementarity of men's and
women's roles; the inclusion of gender and sexual orientation in the
definition of discrimination (the latter revision was not included in the final
draft); states' abilities to limit women's right to pass their nationality on to
their children; and the right to control fertility.
72
Fights that had been settled in prior discussions were rehashed,
sometimes with differing results, and perspectives absent from initial
meetings resurfaced at various points with discordant effects. Perhaps the
most controversial issue was polygamy. Issues that cut to the heart of
family roles and tradition-polygamy being an example-were the focus of
debates at the Experts Meeting. The 1997 draft condemned polygamy but
did not prohibit it if all parties consented. But the 1999 draft included an
absolute ban of polygamy, largely due to NGO pressure. In 2001,
participants at the Experts Meeting could not agree and left three options
Committee on Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and Children to merge
the Draft Protocol with the Draft Convention on Traditional Practices).
69. See BANDA. supra note 8. at 74 (noting that the OAU's revisions included changes
to the articles on education, economic and social and welfare rights, and health and
reproductive rights).
70. Id. at 75 76.
71. Banda, supra note 13, at 447.
72. See BANDA. supra note 8. at 71 (discussing the controversy around provisions
granting reproductive rights to women).
73. Id at 76.
74. Id at 74.
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bracketed. The third option, which prefers monogamy but does not require
it and emphasizes consent in polygamous relationships, was finally chosen
at a second Experts Meeting in 2003.75  Rachel Murray notes that the
discussion on polygamy reopened a debate that had been settled in OAU
16documents and in CEDAW General Recommendation 21. For example,
CEDAW's General Recommendation 21 had concluded that polygamy
"contravenes a woman's right to equality with men, and ... ought to be
discouraged and prohibited.""
There was little continuity between drafts of the Protocol. More
fundamentally, the inability to reach a consensus until the very last stage of
drafting shows how contentious the treatment of family and culture were.
At the conclusion of the 2001 Experts Meeting, delegates supported further
review of a revised draft was needed, as disagreement among states
continued to exist. Participants agreed to meet again at a second Experts
Meeting, but in 2002, two meetings were scheduled and cancelled for lack
of a quorum. NGOs met in June 2002 and passed the "Durban
Declaration," which called for expedient adoption of the Protocol and
effective participation of government experts. 8 At a subsequent meeting in
January 2003, a coalition of NGOs developed a strategy for completing the
Protocol. 9 Organizations pooled their comments in a collective markup of
75. Of the other two options for polygamy, one clause would have prohibited it
whereas another clause would have recognized monogamy only, but protected women
currently in polygamous unions. See Protocol, supra note 1, art. 6(c) ("[M]onogamy is
encouraged as the preferred form of marriage and that the rights of women in marriage and
family, including in polygamous marital relationships are promoted and protected."). Also,
the 2001 Experts Meeting failed to reach agreement on articles concerning monitoring and
amending the Protocol. See Adams & Kang, supra note 4, at 461.
76. See Murray, supra note 2, at 267 n.86-88.
77. Paragraph 14 of General Recommendation 21 states:
States parties' reports also disclose that polygamy is practised in a number of
countries. Polygamous marriage contravenes a woman's right to equality with
men, and can have such serious emotional and financial consequences for her
and her dependents that such marriages ought to be discouraged and prohibited.
The Committee notes with concern that some States parties, whose constitutions
guarantee equal rights, permit polygamous marriage in accordance with personal
or customary law. This violates the constitutional rights of women, and breaches
the provisions of article 5 (a) of the Convention.
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Thirteenth Session,
General Recommendation No. 21, Equality in Marriage and Family Relations. 14. 49th
Sess., Supp. No. 38, U.N. Doc. A/49/38 (Apr. 12. 1994).
78. See Adams & Kang, supra note 4. at 461 (discussing The Durban Declaration).
79. Id.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Wash. & Lee J. Civ. Rts. & Soc. Just. 91 2009-2010
16 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST 79 (2010)
the 2001 draft and focused on incorporating international standards already
ratified by countries.
so
Sally Engle Merry notes similar strategies employed by advocates
drafting international treaties. Reaching a consensus is the driving force of
states' and civil society's discussions, which often results in vague and
wordy documents."' The consensus she describes is rarely evidence-driven
and is more focused on inserting text from other international or regional
documents to which states have already agreed. 2  The process, she
concludes, conceals intractable differences between states. 
3
Civil society did not try to solve differences between drafters,
but instead pushed for an end to the drafting process.8 4  NGOs
directed their attention toward their own governments and lobbied
ministers and state representatives to commit to a second Experts
Meeting to complete the Protocol. In March 2003, well over a year
after the first Experts Meeting, a second Experts Meeting resulted in
textual changes to the 2001 draft, but few substantive changes. The
following disagreements are noteworthy: Libya, Mali, Senegal, and
Togo objected to the right to decide the number and spacing of
children even though the same language is found in CEDAW and
those states are signatories to CEDAW without reservations; 85
Tunisia and Sudan objected to the minimum age of marriage; and
Burundi, Libya, Senegal, and Sudan objected generally to the health
and reproductive rights in Article 14.
86
80. Id.
81. See Sally E. Merry, Human Rights and Global Legal Pluralism: Reciprocity and
Disjuncture, in MOBILE PEOPLE, MOBILE LAW: EXPANDING LEGAL RELATIONS IN A
CONTRACTING WORLD 215, 221 (Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al. eds., 2005).
82. See id ("Using *agreed-upon language- meant that there was no need for further
debate, nor was further debate even appropriate since global consensus already existed about
this language.").
83. See id at 229 ("Localization of human rights does not mean that their cultural
content is transformed.").
84. This is not to imply that fears about not finishing the Protocol were illegitimate.
At some point, advocates had to make the decision whether to move the process of drafting
to its conclusion, rather than to fight ideological battles.
85. BANDA. supra note 8. at 78 n.254.
86. Id at 78. In addition, South Africa and Botswana objected to a death penalty
prohibition for pregnant or nursing women. South Africa objected because it no longer had
a death penalty. Id Libya objected to the protection of women in armed conflict in Article
11(3). Id
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Following the second Experts Meeting, the Protocol was adopted by
the Second African Union Summit on July 11, 2003.87 Women's rights
organizations launched a wide-scale campaign for ratification.88  The
African Union supported the campaign, as demonstrated in the 2004
adoption of a Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa, which
reinforces provisions in the Protocol. The Protocol came into force on
November 25, 2005 with the ratification of Togo-the fifteenth state to sign
and ratify the Protocol.89
C. What the Drafting Process Suggests
Advocates viewed the Protocol as a way "to allow African
governments to fulfill the international commitments [to which] they have
subscribed." 90 Drafters primarily relied on CEDAW, but also looked to the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International
Convention on Population and Development (ICPD), and the Beijing
Platform of the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing Platform). 91
The resulting text based on these influences "waivers between being an
interpretation of the [Charter] for women on the one hand, and a collection
(not a comprehensive one) of some existing international standards on the
other. 
9 2
The first draft looked like a list of rights that attempted to mirror the
structure of the Charter.93 As the drafting process evolved, the Protocol
began to look less like the Charter and more like the international
documents that African states had ratified.94 At one stage, the OAU added
87. Press Release, Fictory for Women's Rights in Africa, PAMBAZUKA NEWS, Oct. 28,
2005, available at http://www.mail-archive.com/pambazuka-newsa pambazuka.org/msg
00026.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2005) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Drafting Process of the Draft Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, 27th
Session, April May 2000, DOC/OS (XXVII)/159b, at 1.
91. Murray, supra note 2. at 264 n.65.
92. Id at 264.
93. Id.
94. See BANDA. supra note 8. at 73 (noting that many of the Protocol rights were
already in other human rights instruments).
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rights to complement regional instruments, and at another stage,
government experts amended text to reflect compromises on issues such as
polygamy, property division upon divorce, and the right to pass nationality
on to children. 95
The resulting draft Protocol reflected this piecemeal approach to
incorporating influences from the Charter, CEDAW, and other regional and
international human rights documents. The problem was that the Protocol's
drafting proceeded without a clear philosophy for its content: "The
omission of some international standards but the inclusion of others does
not give a clear vision of what it intends to reflect, and the Protocol is not
consistent about its use of African instruments or jurisprudence. 9 6 Rights
were added and rearranged, particularly at the 2001 Experts Meeting, but
not as part of a comprehensive discussion about the Protocol's purpose. As
the next Part discusses, the resulting document's structure lacks
consistency. 9'
This is not to undermine the many ways in which the Protocol goes
beyond the international standards on which it is premised. Discussed in
greater depth below, the health and reproductive rights in Article 14 provide
an example. The limited right to an abortion moves beyond the ICPD,
Beijing Platform, and CEDAW. However, the Protocol also fails to meet
existing international standards for reproductive rights.9 Article 14's "right
to self protection and to be protected against sexually transmitted
infections, including HIV/AIDS" is inconsistent with international and
regional treaties that recognize women's particular vulnerability to and
needs resulting from HIV infection. 99
This incoherent vision could be the result of certain characteristics of
the drafting process. There seems to have been varying participation by
NGOs and government experts, and their influence surfaced at different
times. It appears that NGOs made key contributions to the first drafts, but
were less successful in shaping the debates at the Experts Meetings. '0 The
95. Id. at 73-75.
96. Murray, supra note 2. at 253.
97. Id. at 269.
98. See id at 268 (noting that the Draft Protocol did not provide for temporary special
measures to promote women's participation in public life in the way that CEDAW does).
99. See id at 266 67 (contrasting the Protocol's passing reference to HIV/AIDS to the
African Commission's Resolution on the H1V/AIDS Pandemic Threat Against Human
Rights and Humanity).
100. It should also be noted that many of the Protocol's rights have a clear imprint of
NGO influence as seen in the rights to reproductive health.
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strength of the civil society lobby appears to have been in the campaign to
ratify the Protocol and not in negotiating the nuances of its final content.
The Protocol's drafting shows a failure to consider how its various
purposes-regional accountability and international legitimacy-should
converge in a process aligned with a set of defined principles and rights that
supported the document's larger purpose. A treaty drafted
contemporaneously, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (the Convention), illustrates a different trajectory.' 0'
Drafters of the Convention began with eight principles and the recognition
that although the rights of persons with disabilities were protected elsewhere
in international law, the particular needs and voices of persons with
disabilities continued to be undervalued or unrecognized. 0 2 At the beginning
of writing the Convention, an Ad Hoc Committee considered proposals for
what a comprehensive, international convention should look like based on
commitments to social development, human rights, and non-discrimination.
The Ad Hoc Committee held its first session over ten working days in which
many of the thorny questions about the Convention's purpose and structure
were debated. Difficult conversations helped build consensus in the first
session, resulting in agreement on foundational principles among participants
that informed eight sessions of negotiating the substance of the
Convention. 103
101. United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. I thank
Rebecca Cook for suggesting I contrast the Convention's drafting to the Protocol's.
To compare with the process of writing the South Afiican Constitution at the end of
apartheid, see Saras Jagwanth & Christina Murray, No Nation Can Be Free When One Half
ofIt Is Enslaved, in THE GENDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 233 (Beverley Baines
& Ruth Rubio-Marin eds., 2004), discussing the South Afiican Constitution drafters' intent
to make gender equality a value that underpinned the entire constitutional system rather than
a principle "added on."
102. These principles are:
(a) Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the fireedom to
make one's own choices, and independence of persons; (b) Non-discrimination;
(c) Full and effective participation and inclusion in society; (d) Respect for
difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as part. of human diversity
and humanity; (e) Equality of opportunity; (t) Accessibility; (g) Equality
between men and women; (h) Respect for the evolving capacities of children
with disabilities and respect for the right of children with disabilities to preserve
their identities.
Guiding Principles of the Convention. http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid
14&pid 156.
103. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral
International Convention on Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons
with Disabilities (2005). http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/adhoca57357e.htm.
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If one of the primary goals of the Protocol was to create an 'African
CEDAW,' a discussion of how the Protocol should meet that purpose could
have supported the document's relevancy and legitimacy. A well-defined
set of principles guiding the drafting process may have resulted in a
document with a more consistent approach better aligned with drafters'
ultimate goals. 0 4  Instead, the Protocol was shaped by an unreflective
process among changing participants who negotiated discrete points rather
than broad principles.
As Part II demonstrates, the Protocol reflects various theoretical
traditions. Because the Protocol draws from the text of international and
regional documents, it carries with it the influences of those texts. The
result is a set of rights with underlying purposes that may conflict or
contradict each other. The aim of the next Part is not to suggest that
differing understandings of women's rights cannot sit together or inform
each other.1°' Instead, my purpose is to reveal the competing influences
that might undermine the effectiveness of the Protocol going forward,
particularly in the area of health and reproductive rights. As Part III
explains, the result may be a document whose text does not necessarily set a
clear course for addressing the most complex issues that African women
face.
I. Theoretical Underpinnings of the Protocol
The Protocol incorporates various insights of feminist legal theory
expressed in women's rights instruments over the last thirty years. As
Johanna Bond highlights, the main influences on the Protocol-CEDAW
and the Charter-draw from documents with very different normative
goals. 106 CEDAW was written in an era focused on formal equality, and the
104. One could attribute the lack of direction in the drafting process to the states' lack
of will to scrutinize the meaning of women's rights. The more cynical supposition is that
states had low expectations of enforcing Protocol rights and, thus, little incentive to parse out
their meaning.
105. It is not my objective to catalogue all the influences found in the Protocol and
there are influences that I do not address here. For example, the Protocol pays heed to "third
generation" rights such as the right to a healthy and sustainable environment in Article 18 or
the right to sustainable development in Article 19. Arguably. some of this language reflects
influences from the Charter and the Gender Division of the Economic Community of
Western African States. See BANDA. supra note 8. at 57 (noting Gender Division's emphasis
on peacekeeping and finance).
106. See Johanna E. Bond, Gender, Discourse and Contemporary Law in Africa
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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Charter reflects an anti-colonialist movement that valued nationalism and
cultural identity.10 7 Part I's discussion of the clash between equality and
culture makes clear that an attempt to incorporate both perspectives
entrenched some of the debates among feminist theorists. In this Part, I
describe the influence of liberal, dominance, and cultural feminism on the
Protocol and note its relevance to Article 14.
A. Formal and Substantive Equality
The Protocol, like the text of CEDAW, is based on the goal of equality
and aligned with liberal feminism. 18  Article 1(f) of the Protocol mirrors
Article I of CEDAW in its definition of discrimination, 0 9 and Article 2's
state duty to eliminate discrimination and promote equal protection is
similar to Article 2 of CEDAW." 0 Provisions on marriage (excluding
clauses on polygamy and registered marriages, which are discussed below)
are framed in terms of equal rights. For example, Article 6 of the Protocol
speaks of the state's duty to "ensure that women and men enjoy equal rights
107. Id.
108. For a concise account of liberal feminism's central tenets, see Rosalind Dixon,
Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 277, 280-81
(2008). Note that CEDAW, as originally drafted, shows the imprint of liberal feminism. But
General Recommendations and the reports from the CEDAW Committee reveal a changing
appreciation for how women's rights issues are understood.
109. Fareda Banda, Blazing a Trail: The African Protocol on Women's Rights Comes
into Force, 50 J. AFRICAN L. 72, 74 (2006). Article l(f) of the Protocol reads:
-Discrimination against women' means any distinction, exclusion or restriction or any
differential treatment based on sex and whose objectives or effects compromise or destroy
the recognition, enjoyment or the exercise by women, regardless of their marital status, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in all spheres of life." Protocol, supra note 1, art.
1(f). CEDAW Article I reads:
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term *discrimination against
women' shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of
sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis
of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.
CEDAW, supra note 10. art. 1.
110. Article 2(1) of the Protocol, like Article 2 of CEDAW, sets out the duties of
States' Parties to combat discrimination "through appropriate legislative, institutional and
other measures." Protocol. supra note 1. art. 2(1). CEDAW Article 2(1) "To take all
appropriate measures, including legislation. to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations,
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women" is expanded upon
in Article 2(2) of the Protocol. supra note 1. art. 2(2).
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and are regarded as equal partners in marriage," similar to CEDAW and the
ICCPR."' The Protocol's property rights in marriage mirror the common
law's understanding of separate property, as evidenced by equal rights to
acquire and to manage property.
Article 14's treatment of "the right to control fertility" and "the right to
choose any method of contraception" resonates with liberal feminism's
focus on equal and unencumbered choices.1 2  The right to decide the
number and spacing of one's children in Article 14(1)(b) is drawn from
Article 16(1)(e) of CEDAW (with additional language in the Protocol's
version, as is noted in the next Part). This choice-focused language sits
uneasily with other provisions of the Protocol that acknowledge how
abusive or discriminatory treatment undermines women's agency.
Perhaps in answer to this criticism, the Protocol, like CEDAW, also
focuses on de facto or substantive equality." 4 Article 2 of the Protocol not
only includes permission to "take corrective and positive action in those
areas where discrimination against women in law and in fact continues to
exist," but also addresses "the social and cultural patterns of conduct of
women and men." ' 5 Article 2(2) states:
States Parties shall commit themselves to modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of women and men through public education,
information, education and communication strategies, with a view to
111. See CEDAW, supra note 10, art. 16 ("States Parties shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and
family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women.");
see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 23(4), entry into force Mar.
23, 1976, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm [hereinafter ICCPR] ("States Parties
to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and
responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution."). Article
23(4) states: "In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection
of any children." Id. art. 23(4).
112. See Beijing Platform, supra note 40, 17 (discussing the right to control one's
own fertility).
113. Perhaps interpreting Article 14 as a matter of substantive equality as Roselynn
Musa does (who calls Article 14 "central to the realization of women's potential") would
help incorporate an account of women's lived experiences. Roselynn Musa. Provisions of
the Protocol, in BREATHING LIFE INTO THE AFRICAN UNION PROTOCOL ON WOMEN'S RIGHTS
iN AFRICA 19. 22 (Roselynn Musa et al. eds.. 2006).
114. See Banda, supra note 109. at 75 (noting that Article 2 of the Protocol builds on
Articles 2(t) and 5(a) of CEDAW); see also CEDAW General Recommendation No. 25, art.
4 on Temporary Special Measures. CEDAW/C/2004/WP.1 /Rev. 1, 1. http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/index.html (supporting the interpretation of
CEDAW as requiring substantive equality).
115. Protocol, supra note 1. art. 2.
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achieving the elimination of harmful cultural and traditional practices
and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or
the superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women
and men.116
Article 2 highlights that discrimination in practice derives in part from
harmful stereotypes. Article 12 more specifically requires states "to
eliminate all stereotypes in textbooks, syllabuses and the media, that
perpetuate such discrimination."''
Article 14 reflects CEDAW's influence by emphasizing a state duty to
"provide adequate, affordable and accessible health services ... to women
especially those in rural areas."' " Article 14's emphasis on access to
services, especially for marginalized women, places importance on de facto
equality and mirrors language that is found in the ICPD and the Beijing
Platform." 9 As Part III will show, the reference to access to services may
lack the scope of its international predecessors. The Protocol frames
discrimination as a problem for the state as well as private and community
actors. This approach is consistent with CEDAW, which has been
interpreted to reach discriminatory laws and practices regardless of whether
the conduct is caused by the state. 120
The Protocol, however, incorporates rights that deviate from an
equality approach-a consequence of compromises made during the
Protocol's drafting. Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia argued against
"equal rights" and for the principle of complementarity-the idea that laws
should reflect the distinct roles of women and men that align with religious
and traditional norms.121 For example, adding the word "equitable" to the
description of property rights following divorce, separation, or annulment
116. Id. art. 2(2).
117. Id. art. 12.
118. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 14(2)(a).
119. Report of the International Conference on Population and Development,
A/CONF. 171/13 (18 Oct. 1994), 7.3, http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/offeng/
poa.html; Beijing Platform, supra note 40, 95-96, 223; see Sandra Fredman, Beyond the
Dichotomy of Formal and Substantive Equality: Towards a New Definition of Equal Rights,
in TEMPORARY SPECIAL MEASURES: ACCELERATING DE FACTO EQUALITY OF WOMEN UNDER
ARTICLE 4(1) UN CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN 111. 114 (Ineke Boerefijn et al. eds.. 2003) (contrasting formal equality
with an "equality of results" approach. which focuses on "equali[zing] the starting point" by
giving women equal access to the benefits of society); see also Musa, supra note 113. at 22
(describing reproductive rights as "central to the realisation of [women's] potential").
120. Vicki Jackson, Symposium. Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority, and
the US. Court: Gender Equality. 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 271, 275 76 (2003).
121. Banda, supra note 109. at 76.
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in Article 7(d) reflects a major debate at the 2001 Experts Meeting. 2 The
concept of equity also appears in the description of a widow's share of
inheritance in Article 21. 3
It has been noted elsewhere that 'equitable' and 'equal' do not share
the same meaning.12 4  The CEDAW Committee stated in a concluding
observation that the two terms, equal and equitable, were not
interchangeable because equality is objective whereas equity is situational.
Interestingly, Article 14 does not follow CEDAW in emphasizing rights
based on the "equality of men and women." Although this framing may
portend a more expansive reading of Article 14, it could also be read in the
same terms as the 'equitable v. equal debate.' That is, the Article 14 state
duty to protect and respect the health of women may allow for different
treatment of men and women so long as the state is acting to accommodate
women's particular needs.
B. Dominance Feminism and the Treatment of Violence
Other language in the Protocol is distinctly driven by dominance
feminism, which reflects the post-CEDAW attention given to the sexual
exploitation of women and deep debates among feminists about the sources
of women's oppression.1 5  Dominance feminism explains women's
inequality as a product of "a system of sexual subordination in which men
define themselves as subjects, and women as objects."' 2 6 The Protocol
reflects dominance feminism in its protection of women from violence,
including state violence, family or intimate violence, violence or
harassment in public institutions, and cultural violence.27 For example, the
right to dignity in Article 3 focuses on dignity as freedom from "any
122. See id at 74 (discussing the distinction between "equal" and "equitable"). Similar
language also appears in Article 7, guaranteeing that "women and men have reciprocal rights
and responsibilities towards children." Protocol, supra note 1, art. 7.
123. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 21.
124. Banda, supra note 109. at 77 78.
125. The Protocol drew from the Southern Africa Development Council Addendum on
Violence and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. Banda, supra
note 109, at 79. CEDAW makes no reference to "violence," although later CEDAW
documents deal with issues of violence. Id.
126. See Dixon. supra note 108. at 282 (citing the work of Catharine MacKinnon,
Andrea Dworkin, and others).
127. See Banda, supra note 109. at 79 (addressing the themes of violence against
women in the family, within a community, and in public).
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exploitation or degradation of women" and "protection of women from all
forms of violence, particularly sexual and verbal violence."1 28 The Protocol
reaches beyond CEDAW and regional instruments in its extensive
treatment of violence, causing one commentator to note that the provisions
addressing abuse or exploitation of women is where "the Protocol comes
into its own."'
29
Violence against women is treated as a pervasive problem for the law
to solve. In several places, the Protocol imposes sanctions on perpetrators
for violent or harassing behavior. 30 One of the most striking examples is
the Protocol's treatment of female genital mutilation (FGM), which is the
phrase used by the Protocol. The choice to use 'female genital mutilation,'
rather than female genital cutting or female circumcision, also reflects a
position that resonates with dominance feminist thinking. Female genital
mutilation has been some feminists' prime example of the way in which a
customary practice in a patriarchal society controls women's sexuality.
Research documenting the health outcomes of FGM need not be restated
here; much time and attention has been paid to the deleterious effects of the
most drastic (although less commonly practiced) forms of female
circumcision.' 3' Those wishing to emphasize the violent nature of a
circumcision procedure have objected to the use of alternative phrasing that
may convey less judgment about the practice.
In addition to its choice of language, the Protocol's invocation of state
power to limit customary violence also reflects the influence of dominance
feminism. Article 5 obliges States Parties to outlaw the practice of FGM
and to provide health and rehabilitative services for those who have already
undergone FGM.132 Requiring more than present international standards,
the Protocol requires "legislative measures backed by sanctions." 33
128. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 3.
129. Banda, supra note 109, at 79.
130. For example, Article 12(1)(b) of the Protocol provides for sanctions against the
perpetrators of "all forms of abuse, including sexual harassment in schools and other
educational institutions." Protocol. supra note 1. art. 12(1)(b). See also Protocol. supra note
1, art. 13(m) (requiring the state to "take effective legislative and administrative measures to
prevent the exploitation and abuse of women in advertising and pornography").
131. See Note, What's Culture Got To Do With It? Excising the Harmful Tradition of
Female Circumcision, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1944, 1946 1947 (1993) (describing three forms
of female circumcision (excision, clitoridectomy, and infibulation) and the range of each
procedure's invasiveness).
132. Protocol, supra note 1. art. 5.
133. Id
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Other provisions of the Protocol also promote criminalization of
certain practices and invoke the power of the state to protect women 34-a
strategy often aligned with dominance feminism because it casts men as
perpetrators and the government as the entity responsible for holding them
accountable. 35  For example, Article 14(1)(d) sets out the "right to self
protection and to be protected against sexually transmitted infections."
36
This right is strengthened by Article 14(1)(e), which specifies a "right to be
informed on the health status of one's partner, particularly if affected with
sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS."' 131 Research
suggests that the spread of HIV to women is due in part to women's lack of
power in negotiating when and how sex occurs (including practicing safe
sex). 13  As Part III discusses, Article 14(1) could have incorporated any
number of approaches for addressing the impact of HIV infection on
women. Instead it focuses solely on the problem of women who are
infected by their husbands or partners. The language of Article 14(1)(d)
focuses on the power dynamic between men and women rather than socio-
economic concerns (such as access to medicine) and dignitary harms (such
as ending the stigma associated with living with HIV).
C. Cultural Feminism and Gender Differences
The Protocol was also influenced by cultural feminism, which seeks to
value the differences (biological and social) that make women distinct from
men. 39 Unlike dominance feminism, which situates gender differences in
terms of the perpetuation of male power, and unlike liberal feminism,
which explains disparate treatment based on gender as unjust, cultural
134. For example, Article 6(d) requires marriages "to be recorded in writing and
registered in accordance with national laws, in order to be legally recognized." Id. art. 6(d).
Banda notes that this may threaten many marriages that are not registered. Banda, supra
note 109, at 76. See also Protocol, supra note 1, art. 7(a) (requiring that "separation, divorce
or annulment of a marriage shall be effected by judicial order").
135. See Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal
Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in
Contemporary Governance Feminism. 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335. 341 (2006) (discussing
the unintended consequences of feminists' reliance on criminalization).
136. Protocol, supra note 1. art. 14(1)(d).
137. Id art. 14(1)(e).
138. BANDA. supra note 8. at 192 93 (discussing women's reluctance to ask for
protected sex out of fear of violence from their partner).
139. See Dixon. supra note 108. at 281 (citing authors such as Robin West and Carol
Gilligan when drawing a distinction between cultural and liberal feminism).
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feminism embraces roles traditionally aligned with women (like
motherhood) and argues that injustice is the result of devaluing those roles.
The Protocol recognizes a standalone right for pregnant or nursing women
in detention to an environment "suitable to their condition and the right to
be treated with dignity."' 40 In a similar vein, Article 4(j) prohibits the death
penalty for pregnant or nursing women,' 4' and Article 13(h) seeks to
"recognise the economic value of the work of women in the home."' 4 2
These and other articles protect particular sub-populations of disadvantaged
women, such as the elderly, the disabled, and "women in distress," which
includes poor women and "women heads of families."
Article 14(2)(b) protects mothers directly by creating a state duty to
"establish and strengthen existing pre-natal, delivery and post-natal health
and nutritional services for women during pregnancy and while they are
breast-feeding."' 43  The language, like that for pregnant women in
detention, carves out rights for mothers. This could be troubling for both
dominance and liberal feminism. Liberal feminism might object to the
emphasis on women's maternal health needs, which may marginalize other
reproductive health needs (like treatment of STIs or screening for cervical
cancer). Dominance feminism could view mothers' caretaking role as a
product of a private/public distinction that works to women's disadvantage
and men's advantage. Cultural feminism, however, might support a
substantive equality analysis: Because many women act in a caretaking
role and the majority of women become mothers, the Protocol should
recognize that reality of women's lives.
The Protocol does not appear to favor one reading over another.
However, the Protocol does seek to temper the culture/equality debate in
one regard. Cultural feminism may be more aligned with the approach
taken in the Charter, which acknowledges the importance of custom and
tradition to communal identity. A contribution of cultural feminism is its
recognition of women's role in maintaining and shaping tradition. 44 This
value is reflected in Article 17, which, like the Charter, promotes respect
for women's roles within their communities. The first clause of Article 17
140. Protocol, supra note 1. art. 24(b).
141. Id. art. 4(j). Arguably, this language may also serve the interests of the fetus. See
infra Part III (highlighting the Protocol's references to women's maternal role).
142. Id. art. 13(h).
143. Id. art. 14(2)(b).
144. One of the purposes of the Protocol was to temper the language of the Charter, and
the Preamble's requirement that African values must be in compliance with "equality, peace,
freedom, dignity, justice. solidarity, and democracy" goes to that end. Id. Preamble.
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creates the right to a "positive cultural context" and to participate in
determining cultural policies.1 45 Taken in conjunction with Article 18-the
right to protect and enable development of "women's indigenous
knowledge" (seemingly a replacement for the Charter's phrase, "cultural
development")-the right to a positive cultural context may call for the
reform of customary laws. 
4 6
The following Part shows how differing theoretical vantage points
may yield differing interpretations of the Protocol's treatment of health and
reproductive rights.
III Problems with the Protocol's Treatment of Health
and Reproductive Rights
The different feminist influences on the Protocol highlight the
incoherence of the Protocol as a modern women's rights instrument, and
these conflicts are at issue in the interpretation of Article 14. The previous
Part highlighted what those influences are and how Article 14 might reflect
each of them. The central question in this Part is how the absence of basic
definitional principles for the drafting process left the Protocol vulnerable
to competing accounts of women's rights, which may stunt the document's
future interpretation. As a way of thinking about Article 14 more critically,
this Part discusses three shortcomings of Article 14 as it is currently
configured: its failure to recognize the interdependence of various rights;
the underdevelopment of women's rights to comprehensive health care; and
the contradictory acknowledgment of women's "natural" role as mothers
and women's rights to autonomy or freedom from stereotype.
Article 14 has two sections. The first section ensures the "right to
health of women, including sexual and reproductive health, is respected and
promoted"'14 and elaborates on the right by setting out six particular areas
of control or decision-making. These areas include the right to control
fertility; the right to decide whether to have children, the number of
children, and the spacing of children; the right to choose any method of
contraception; the right to self protection and to be protected against
sexually transmitted infections; the right to be informed of one's health
145. Id. art. 17.
146. See Charter, supra note 5. art. 29(7) (promoting the moral well being of society);
see also Beyani, supra note 32. at 285 (discussing how the Charter showed that regional
instruments recognized general concepts of human rights).
147. Protocol, supra note 1. art. 14.
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status and the health status of one's partner; and the right to have family
planning education. 
148
The second section refers to "appropriate measures" States Parties
shall undertake to accomplish three goals. The first goal is to "provide
adequate, affordable and accessible health services, including information,
education and communication programmes to women especially those in
rural areas.',4 9 The second is to "establish and strengthen existing pre-
natal, delivery and post-natal health and nutritional services for women
during pregnancy and while they are breast-feeding."' 5 ° And the third, and
perhaps most controversial,' 5 ' is to "protect the reproductive rights of
women by authorising medical abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape,
incest, and where the continued pregnancy endangers the mental and
physical health of the mother or the life of the mother or the foetus."' 52
As heralded elsewhere, Article 14 of the Protocol represents important
'firsts,' such as the first time that the right to abortion or the right to control
one's own fertility were enumerated in a human rights document.' 3 Article
14 also recognizes rights with longstanding histories, such as the right to
decide the number and spacing of children. But Article 14 (and perhaps the
Protocol in general) does not appear to ground its approach to reproductive
health in a way that embraces the field's complexity. Certainly, issues like
the prohibition of FGM or early marriage resonate with concerns about
protecting women's reproductive health, yet the Protocol does not refer
back to or connect these issues. The provision related to FGM could have
been even more powerful if it were linked to women's sexual and
reproductive freedom. One major objection to FGM, highlighted briefly in
the previous section, is that it can impair women's future fertility or ability
to experience sexual pleasure. 14 The Protocol could have acknowledged
148. Article 14(l)(e) reads: "[T]he right to be informed on one's health status and on
the health status of one's partner, particularly if affected with sexually transmitted infections,
including HIV/AIDS, in accordance with internationally recognised standards and best
practices." Id. art. 14(l)(e).
149. Id. art. 14(2).
150. Id.
151. See Banda, supra note 109. at 82 (discussing how Libya, Rwanda, and Senegal
opposed the right to abortion in the Protocol).
152. Protocol, supra note 1. art. 14(2).
153. See Gawaya & Mukasa, supra note 9. at 42 (stating that the Protocol is the first
document in international law to recognize a woman's right to a medical abortion); BANDA,
supra note 8. at 80 (stating that the Protocol was the first international document to discuss
substantive reproductive rights and the right to an abortion).
154. See REBECCA COOK ET AL., REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND HuMAN RiGHTs 263 66
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that the cultural barriers to eliminating circumcision are rooted in
communities that value female chastity or sexual submission."' Linking
the rights in Article 5 to the right to healthy sexual development might have
tempered the emphasis on violence previously described. Similarly, the
prohibition on early marriage could have referenced the health risks
associated with early childbirth and the loss of sexual and reproductive
decision-making it entails for many girls. 56 A more integrated approach
might have linked these rights in ways that could have strengthened their
relationship to socio-economic and other rights for women. 5
Article 14 is titled a health right and references a state duty to "provide
adequate, affordable and accessible health services, and information,
education and communication programmes to women especially those in
rural areas."' 58 For text that deals broadly with women's health, Article 14
underemphasizes developments in international thinking about access to
healthcare. For example, the ICESCR recognizes the right to the highest
attainable standard of healthcare. 59 The Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights further elaborated what the highest attainable standard
for women means by endorsing "a comprehensive national strategy for
promoting women's right to health throughout their life span" that would
include "prevention and treatment of diseases affecting women, as well as
policies to provide access to a full range of high quality and affordable
health care, including sexual and reproductive services," and "removal of
all barriers interfering with access to health services, education and
information, including in the area of sexual and reproductive health.'
60
Most significantly, the Charter itself relies on a "best attainable" standard in
(2003) (describing how female circumcision in deeply embedded in the practices of several
East and West African communities).
155. Id. Rachel Murray notes that the articles on FGM are not wholly in line with the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Harmful Practices Affecting the
Fundamental Rights of Women and Girls. See also Murray, supra note 2, at 269 n.96
(noting that the Protocol addresses the healthcare needs of rural women but not migrants and
sex workers).
156. BANDA, supra note 8, at 186-87.
157. See COOK. supra note 154. at 8 9 (emphasizing the significance of reproductive
health for women because "[1]ifestyle. behaviour, and socio-economic conditions play an
important role in promoting or undermining reproductive health").
158. Protocol, supra note 1. art. 14(2)(a).
159. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), 12, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16. 1966) (entered into force Jan. 3. 1976).
160. U.N. ECON. & Soc. COUNCIL, Comm. ON ECON., SOC. & CULTURAL RIGHTS,
Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 21. U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2000/4 (Nov. 8. 2000).
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Article 16161 as does Article 14 of the African Charter on the Rights and
Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), which recognizes the right to "the best
attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health" and sets out a
number of state duties in furtherance of the best attainable standard. 
62
The Protocol's promise of adequate healthcare potentially falls short of
a best attainable standard. The state only needs to provide adequate
healthcare that meets women's needs rather than a range of services based
on best practices. Article 14 could have imposed a duty on states to
reconsider the allocation of resources in order to achieve better delivery of
health services, such as directing state funds toward the development of
primary health care systems. This approach would not have been out of
step with other language in the Protocol. For example, Article 4(i) creates a
state duty to "provide adequate budgetary and other resources for the
implementation and monitoring of actions aimed at preventing and
eradicating violence against women." 1
63
One example where a higher standard for health might have been
useful is in the Protocol's treatment of HIV/AIDS. The rights to self-
protection from HIV and to know a partner's HIV status were added at the
2001 Experts Meeting but have been criticized as far too narrow in light of
the scope of the HIV epidemic. 64 International documents address HIV in
terms of rights to the highest attainable standard of healthcare, dignity, and
equality. 65 This standard means more than recognizing the right to non-
discrimination based on one's health status The highest attainable standard
of health has been interpreted as active government participation in seeking
the most effective treatments for those living with HIV and stemming the
spread of HIV. Additionally, the right to dignity (as interpreted in the
161. See Charter, supra note 5, art. 16(1) ("Every individual shall have the right to
enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health.").
162. Afiican Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Organization of Afiican
Unity, 1990, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49, entered into force Nov. 29, 1999 [hereinafter
ACRWC].
163. Protocol, supra note 1. art. 4(i). Note also that Article 10, the Right to Peace.
states: "States Parties shall take the necessary measures to reduce military expenditure
significantly in favour of spending on social development in general. and the promotion of
women in particular." Id. art. 10.
164. See Banda, supra note 109. at 81 (questioning how many women would ask their
partners about their HIV status).
165. See COOK. supra note 154. at 12 (examining the expanding definition of
reproductive health in international law). It is also strange that the Protocol does not link
womens inequality with susceptibility to HIV. as the CEDAW Committee has.
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South African context, for example1 66) implies there is a role for state and
private actors to counteract the stigma that has attached historically to HIV.
Finally, the Protocol sends conflicting messages about women's roles
as mothers. On one hand, Article 14's approach is intended to strengthen
reproductive autonomy by situating it within Article 14's health rights. On
the other hand, Article 14 does not necessarily confront assumptions about
aspects of women's familial and societal roles. Much has been written
about how expectations that women conform to the role of wife or mother
limit women's agency.16  Certain cultural norms may not recognize
women's reproductive or sexual rights because sexuality itself is considered
masculine. 68  Customary laws addressing reproductive capacity and a
woman's role in the family may be designed to facilitate male control over
women's sexual behavior and reproductive decisions.1
69
As noted in Part I, the protection for women only as mothers is one of
the main points of criticism of the Charter,' 0 and it is one that has created
tension in earlier international documents. 7' The Protocol appears to
embrace women's special role as mothers by protecting pregnant and
nursing women. Article 14 emphasizes pre-natal, delivery, and post-natal
health and nutritional services for women during pregnancy. 72 The
Protocol's language thus reaffirms women's maternal role (based in part on
the ACRWC) while it also emphasizes autonomy-based rights, such as a
right to decide the number and spacing of one's children. This observation
is not intended to minimize the importance of pre-natal and post-natal care
for women or to ignore its recognition in international human rights law,
166. See Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S.
Aft.) (recognizing a right to most effective treatment); N.M. v. Smith, 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC)
(S. Aft.) (elaborating on the ways in which the dignity of HIV-positive persons is threatened
by societal stigma).
167. See Sylvia Tamale, Gender Trauma in Africa: Enhancing Access to Resources, 48
J. AFRICAN L. 50, 52-53 (2004) (arguing that women's reproductive capacity is one factor in
the naturalization of gender roles and dichotomization of the public and private spheres).
168. BANDA, supra note 8, at 173.
169. See Adjetey, supra note 23, at 1352-53 (arguing that cultural traditions around
reproduction "keep African women in cultural subordination and put them in such a low
bargaining position that they have little, if any, control over decisions which affect their
bodily integrity").
170. Charter, supra note 5. art. 16(1).
171. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217A, art. 25. U.N. GAOR 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12. 1948) [hereinaftler UDHR] (granting special
care and assistance for mothers); CEDAW. supra note 10. art. 12(2) (addressing "pregnancy,
confinement, and the post-natal period").
172. Protocol, supra note 1. art. 14(2)(b).
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such as the Article 12 right to health in CEDAW. 7 3 The Protocol appears
to cut against the stereotype of women as mothers in other places. One
instance is the right to decide "whether to have children," which
complements the right to decide the number and spacing of children. 174
Perhaps this language could have been expanded: Article 14, which speaks
to a reproductive health agenda concerned with family planning, could have
included language that more specifically related to sexual expression and
procreative decision making.'
Serving as a counterintuitive example of the implicit support of
maternal stereotypes, the right to an abortion may inadvertently align with a
pro-natalist vision for women. Article 14(2)(c) identifies a right to medical
abortion for women with sympathetic reasons-women who are victims of
rape, incest, or sexual assault. The striking aspect of Article 14(2)(c) is the
right to medical abortion for the women whose physical or mental health is
at risk. This provision for mental health stands in contrast with most of the
abortion laws in Africa, many of which recognize no right to an abortion on
that ground (or any of the grounds stated in Article 14(2)(c) for that
matter).'16 That being said, the right to a legal abortion because of a risk to
mental health, like the other grounds in 14(2)(c), seeks to protect the
potentially "unstable" woman."'
173. Article 12 of CEDAW reads:
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of
equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those
related to family planning. 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of
this article, States Parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in
connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free
services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and
lactation.
CEDAW, supra note 10, art. 12.
174. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 14.
175. See Banda, supra note 109, at 81 (noting that the ICPD changed the international
framework for reproductive rights by shifting focus from family planning to individual well-
being); see also COOK, supra note 154, at 4 (stating that the ICPD adopted the first
internationally-recognized definition of reproductive health).
176. See Chad Gerson, Toward an International Standard of Abortion Rights:
Empirical Data from Africa. 18 PACE INT'L L. REv. 373. 377 (2006) (conducting a study of
attitudes toward abortion in African states); see also Banda, supra note 109. at 82
(questioning whether Article 14(2)(c) will be enforced because of the variation in member
states' laws on abortion).
177. Article 14(2)(c) refers to a "medical abortion," which is administered only in the
first trimester of pregnancy. Protocol, supra note 1. art. 14(2)(c). The clause presumably
does not apply to second or third trimester abortions.
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The Protocol could have tried to uncouple stereotypes about women by
including text that recognized the rights of those women who are not
mothers or wives. For instance, what would creating a positive cultural
context under Article 17 look like for women who choose not to become a
mother? Instead, the Protocol is better characterized as accepting the
"benevolent" stereotype of women as caretaker 78 and lacks critical
engagement with the ways that stereotypes conflict with rights rooted in
language of self determination.
IV Conclusion
The tension between the elimination of stereotypes and the special
recognition of motherhood has long been at the center of feminist debate.
Article 14 may have missed an opportunity to tie together the elimination of
stereotypes, women's role in the family, and reproductive and sexual health
in a way particular to an African context. This may have been especially
important to young women and girls whose rights are scattered throughout
the Protocol in inconsistent ways. 179 Moreover, the Protocol could have
framed reproductive rights within its broader objectives, such as the
elimination of poverty and disease 8° and the reform of colonialist laws."'
This Article, though critical of the Protocol in many ways, is not
fatalistic about its potential. Bold and clear application of the
implementation and interpretation clauses could ensure that the Protocol
evolves into a responsive human rights instrument for women. Article 26
creates a duty to "indicate the legislative and other measures undertaken for
the full realisation of the rights [of the Protocol] in a state's periodic reports
submitted in accordance with Article 62 of the African Charter.' 8 2 The
same powerful NGO lobby that helped bring the Protocol into force could
178. Rebecca Cook, Washington and Lee Symposium, April 3, 2009.
179. For example, see Articles I(k) in definition, Article II in conflict, Article 12 in
schools. Protocol, supra note 1, arts. 1(k), 11, 12. Article 13(g) in particular prohibits the
work of children and exploitation of the "girl-child." ld. art. 13(g). A couple of these
provisions refer to male children also. Id. art. 11.
180. See Odinkalu, supra note 16. at 3 (discussing how the African continent's history
makes it difficult to achieve even modest progress in the realm of human rights).
181. See Charles Ngwena, An Appraisal of Abortion Laws in Southern Africa from a
Reproductive Health Rights Perspective. 32 J. L. MED. & ETICs 708 (2004) (showing the
imprint of colonial legacies on current abortion laws in southern Africa); see also Odinkalu.
supra note 16. at 11 (noting that new bills of rights have not been followed by the repeal of
colonial era legislation).
182. Protocol, supra note 1. art. 26.
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shape the ways in which states interpret and implement Protocol provisions.
The caveat in Article 3 1-that "[n]one of the provisions of the... Protocol
shall affect more favourable provisions . .. in the national legislation of
States Parties or in any other regional, continental or international
conventions, treaties or agreements applicable in these States Parties",83
may serve as a standard by which Protocol provisions are measured against
future innovations in women's human rights thinking. Finally, in according
the power to interpret the Protocol to the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), Article 27 gives a new institution a sense of
responsibility for the development of women's rights.
The Protocol represents a great deal of possibility even if the process
of understanding the Protocol's meaning happens after its ratification.
Despite shortcomings in its drafting, the mechanisms described above
might aid willing member states and NGOs to support a progressive,
substantive vision for the Protocol-one that will evolve to meet African
women's diverse and changing needs.
183. Id. art. 31.
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